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I. INTRODUCTION

In August 2002, consumers filed a class action lawsuit against McDonald's, Burger King, Wendy's, and Kentucky Fried Chicken alleging that fast
food was responsible for their obesity and poor health.' Predictably, a barrage
of op-ed pieces denounced the lawsuits as "absurd" 2 and an attempt to "bilk
burger joints for billions." 3 One Seattle restaurant even went so far as to require
customers to sign a tongue-in-cheek waiver
of liability when they ordered a
4
popular dessert known as "The Bulge."
Although public opinion ridiculed lawsuits against Big Fat, law professor John F. Banzhaf of George Washington University, famous for his involvement in the tobacco litigation, says that he has heard this argument before.
"Everything's always called frivolous, but we just keep winning the damn
things." 5 As a general proposition, Banzhaf's theory can be succinctly stated as
follows: fast food companies have neglected to inform consumers about the
dangers of their products, have made misleading health claims, and have exerted
undue pressure on children in order to increase revenue. These infractions, the
reasoning goes, have all played a causative role in the development of a number
of health problems ranging from obesity to diabetes. Accordingly, plaintiffs are
entitled to compensation in the form of economic and non-economic damages.
The issue has captured the attention of Congress, which has introduced
three bills in direct response to the fast food litigation. 6 Two bills seek to preempt current and future lawsuits that allege injuries that arise from the consumption of a restaurant's food products. 7 Another bill would require restaurants to
place nutritional information about their food products in plain view so that con-8
sumers can make well-informed decisions when they order their meals.
1
See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), dismissed by 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,2003).
2
Oh, temptation, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 2002, at 12.
Joel Mowbray, Sue McDonald's?, NATIONAL REviEW, Dec. 2, 2002, available at LEXIS,
News Library, National Review file.
3

4

Blane Harden, Fat-laden Dessert Mocks Obesity Suits,

WASH.

POST., Sept. 21, 2003, at All.

(describing "The Bulge" as a "sugarcoated, deep-fried, ice cream swaddled, caramel-drizzled,
whipped-cream-anointed banana").
Libby Copeland, Snack Attack: After Taking On Big Tobacco, Social Reformer Jabs at a
New Target: Big Fat, WASH. POST., Nov. 3, 2002, at F1.
5

See Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2003);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003); The Menu Education and
Labeling Act, H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003).
6

7

See Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2003);

Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003).
8

See The Menu Education and Labeling Act, H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003).
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Whether these bills will become law is a question that will only be answered in
time. It can be said however, that for better or worse, Professor Banzhaf and his
lawsuits have already had an impact on the American political and legal landscape.
The analysis herein will subject Professor Banzhaf s novel theory to the
rigorous contours of tort and product liability jurisprudence. Part II begins with
a brief discussion of the current state of law surrounding fast food litigation and
then presents the three issues that were discussed in the plaintiffs amended complaint when heard during the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss stage in the litigation process. Next, Part III focuses on providing clear distinctions between the
fast food litigation and the previously successful tobacco litigation upon which
the plaintiff's rely. Part IV considers the consequences of proposed legislation
that will effectively preempt future lawsuits of this nature. Finally, Part V concludes by providing a brief and concise summation of the legal and social ramifications of fast food litigation.
II. A PLAINTIFF'S ROADMAP FOR SUCCESS: PELMAN V.MCDONALD'S
In the interest of brevity, the following summation serves to highlight
only those allegations that were considered by the court in the plaintiffs'
amended complaint. While the court spoke at considerable length on issues
ancillary to these allegations when it rendered its opinion on the original complaint, the focus of this section is to provide the reader a brief background of the
pertinent issues surrounding fast food litigation.
On January 22, 2003, the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of
New York decided the first case involving fast food litigation. 9 As is always the
case when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "courts must 'accept as
true the factual allegations of the complaint, and draw all inferences in favor of
the pleader." ' " 0 "The complaint may only be dismissed when 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitled [sic] him to relief."'"1
The facts of Pelman are straightforward. The class action infant plaintiffs, Ashley Pelman and Jazlen Bradley, purchased and consumed fast food on a
regular basis throughout their respective lives.' 2 While the complaint did not
specify the number of meals consumed at McDonald's, affidavits attached to the
opposition papers suggest significant consumption. 3 One plaintiff stated that
9
See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), dismissed by 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003).
1o Id. at 524 (citing Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir. 1993)).
11

Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,45-46 (1957)).

12

Id. at 519.

13

Id.at 538 n.28.
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between the ages of five and twelve, she visited McDonald's "approximately
three to four times a week."' 14 Another explained, "on ... [her] way to school
and during school lunch breaks, . . . [she] mostly ate at McDonalds [sic] restau-

rants." 15 As a result of this consumption, the plaintiffs alleged that they "have
become overweight and have developed diabetes, coronary heart disease, high
blood pressure, elevated cholesterol intake, and/or other detrimental and adverse
16
health effects as a result of the defendants' conduct and business practices."
On August 22, 2002, suit was filed in the State Supreme Court of New
York, Bronx County, but it was subsequently removed to the Federal District
Court in the Southern District of New York.1 7 The plaintiffs alleged the following five claims against McDonald's: 18 1) McDonalds's deceptively advertised
their food as healthy, and failed to adequately disclose nutritional information,
2) McDonald's induced children to eat their products through deceptive marketing techniques, 3) McDonald's negligently sold "food products that are high in
cholesterol, fat, salt and sugar when studies show that such foods cause obesity
and detrimental health effects," 4) McDonald's failed to warn consumers of the
unhealthy attributes of McDonald's products, and 5) McDonald's negligently
19
psychologically addictive."
marketed food products that were "physically and
20
None of these counts survived 12(b)(6) scrutiny.
In the Pelman opinion, Judge Robert W. Sweet went to great lengths to
create a roadmap for the plaintiffs success when he described in detail the
showing needed to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. After the court sustained McDonald's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff amended the complaint to
include only three causes of action. 21 After considering these arguments, the
22
The following
court again sustained the motion to dismiss with prejudice.
section will summarize Judge Sweet's analyses on each of the three counts.

14

Id.

15

16

Id.
Id. at 519.

17

Id.

18

Note that the first two counts are based on deceptive acts and practices in violation of the
Consumer Protection from Deceptive Acts and Practices Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. §§ 349, 350 (2004),
and the NEW YORK CiTY ADMINISTRATIVE CODES §§ 20-700-06 (2003). Id. at 520.
19

20

id.
Id. at 543.

21

See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202, *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [here-

inafter Pelman 11].
22

Id. at *1.
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III. JUDGE SWEET'S ANALYSES OF THE PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT

The plaintiffs' amended complaint focused on the following three
counts, all of which were alleged to be in violation of New York's Consumer
Protection from Deceptive Act and Practices Act ("Consumer Protection
Act"): 23 1) that McDonald's misled the public through advertising campaigns
that purported to sell nutritious food products, 2) that McDonald's failed to adequately disclose pertinent health information, and 3) that McDonald's engaged
in unfair and deceptive activities by stating that itprovided adequate nutritional
information to consumers when in fact it did not. The plaintiffs again alleged
that these deceptive acts all resulted in debilitating health conditions such as
obesity, diabetes, coronar
heart disease, high blood pressure, elevated choles2
terol levels, and the like. !
A.

A ProceduralHurdle: The Statute ofLimitations

The court began its analysis with an evaluation of whether the plaintiffs'
claims were time barred by the statute of limitations. 26 In both the original and
amended complaints, the plaintiffs relied on a 1987 McDonald's advertising
campaign in which the New York Attorney General's Office conducted an investigation of deceptive advertising practices.27 Under New York law, however,
28
a three-year limitations period on deceptive practices has been recognized.
While the plaintiffs made several attempts to convince the court that this period
did not apply under these particular facts, only one argument was successful:
that the statute of limitations did not run because several members of the plaintiffs' class action suit were "infants" (i.e., those plaintiffs under the age of eighteen). 29 New York law recognizes that the statute of limitations does not begin
to accrue until an infant plaintiff reaches the age of eighteen.
In this case,
23

N.Y. GEN. Bus. §§ 349, 350 (2004). Note that section 349 makes unlawful "deceptive acts

or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service
in this state." Id. § 349. Note also that section 350 prohibits "false advertising in the conduct of
any business." Id. § 350.
24
Pelman I, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202 at *6.
25

Id. at *7.

26

Id. at **12-18.

27

Id. at *12.

28

Id. at **12-13 (citing Morelli v. Weider Nutrition Group, Inc., 712 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y.

App. Div. 2000)).
29
Id. at **17-18.
30

Id. (citing Henry v. City of New York, 724 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1999)).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 10
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107

Accordingly, the
seven members of the class fit the definition of an "infant.'
court ruled that all claims by adult plaintiffs based on the 1987 McDonald's
32
On
the
advertising campaigns were time-barred by the statute of limitations.
33
proceed.
to
allowed
were
plaintiffs
infant.
by
brought
claims
other hand, all
Substantive Hurdles: Causation & Deceptive Advertisements

B.

After ruling that only the infant members of the plaintiffs class could
survive the statute of limitations analysis, the court next turned to the following
three issues: 1) whether the plaintiffs were justifiable in their reliance on
McDonald's deceptive advertising campaign, 2) whether the consumption of
McDonald's food products caused the plaintiffs' injuries, and 3) whether the
McDonald's advertising campaigns were objectively misleading. 34 The court
plaintiffs on two of the issues and dismissed the complaint
found against the
35
with prejudice.

1.

Plaintiffs Can Establish Reliance on Deceptive Advertising
Claim

The plaintiffs were able to successfully state a false advertising claim in
their amended complaint. 36 Section 350 of New York's Consumer Protection
Act prohibits "false advertising in the conduct of any business." 37 New York
common law also makes clear that in order to state a claim under section
38 350,

the plaintiff must allege "reliance on the allegedly false advertisement."
To meet this burden, the plaintiffs cited as evidence a McDonald's advertising claim in which it stated that the ingredients in french fries and hash

browns would be "switched to 100 percent vegetable oil," when in fact, those
products contained "beef or extracts and trans fatty acids." 39 Drawing all rea31

Id. at **17-18.

32

Id. at *18.

33

Id.

34

Id. at **19-39.

35

Id. at *39.
Id. at **19-27.

36

N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 350; see also Stutman v. Chem. Bank, 731 N.E.2d 608, 611-12 (N.Y.
2000) (stating that a plaintiff, to bring a claim under section 349, must prove: first, that the challenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way;
and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act).
38
See Andre Strishak & Assoc., P.C. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 752 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (N.Y.
37

App. Div. 2002).
39

Pelman 11, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202 at *25.
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sonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, the court ruled that the infant plaintiffs were aware of this advertising claim and would not have purchased or consumed McDonald's products but for the false advertising claim.40 As will be
discussed later, however, this claim was unable to survive additional procedural
hurdles because the plaintiffs were unable to establish causation of injuries and
that the advertising campaign was objectively misleading.
2.

Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Causation of Injuries

One of the reasons that the plaintiffs were unable to survive 12(b)(6)
scrutiny in their claims for false advertising is because they could not establish
the element of causation. 4 1 At the outset of its discussion, the court noted that
this element was the "most formidable hurdle for [the] plaintiffs" to overcome.42
In order to proceed under section 350 of the New York Consumer Protection
Act, the plaintiffs needed to show that the consumption of McDonald's food
products caused identifiable injuries "'as a result of a deceptive act." 4 3 While
the amended complaint did provide evidence of the plaintiffs enormous appetite
for McDonald's food products, 44 it did not address other variables, such as exercise and genetic history, that also play a causative role in the outcome of a person's overall physical condition.45 Without such evidence, the court noted, it is
impossible to determine if McDonald's food products caused theplaintiffs' obesity, or if those food products were only a contributing factor. Accordingly,
the plaintiffs were unable to establish causation in their claims that they had
suffered
injuries as a result of the over-consumption of McDonald's food prod47
ucts.

3.

Reliance on Advertisement Was Not Objective

The plaintiffs were also unable to survive 12(b)(6) scrutiny in their
claims for false advertising because they could not sufficiently establish that the
40

Id. at *26.

41

Id.at ** 26-34.
Id. at 26.

42

43

Id. (quoting Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 741 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (N.Y.

App. Div. 2002)).
44

Id. at *31 (quoting the plaintiffs' amended complaint, the court stated as an example that

Jazlyn Bradley is alleged to have "'consumed McDonald's foods her entire life ...during school
lunch breaks and before and after school, approximately five times per week, ordering two meals
per day"').
45

Id at **31-32.

46

Id. at *33.

47

Id. at *34.
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advertisements were objectively misleading. 4 8 In order to demonstrate that an
advertisement is misleading under section 349 of the New York Consumer Protection Act, the plaintiff must show that49"a reasonable consumer would have
been misled by the defendant's conduct."
In this case, the plaintiffs contended that McDonald's made two misrepresentations to consumers in its advertisements. 50 First, the plaintiffs alleged
that McDonald's misrepresented the cholesterol content of its french fries and
hash browns when it stated that these products contain "zero milligrams of cholesterol." 51 In point of fact, however, this assertion was flatly wrong. The court
immediately noted that the plaintiffs' amended complaint was factually incorrect concerning the language of the advertisement in question because the
McDonald's advertisement actually states that "a regular order of french fries is
and saturated fat: only 9 mg of cholesterol and
surprisingly low in cholesterol
52
fat."
saturated
of
grams
4.6
Having fallen well short of the mark in their first allegation, the plaintiffs next turned to a McDonald's advertisement that stated that its fries are
cooked in "100 percent vegetable oil" which thus rendered its fries cholesterolfree. 53 The plaintiffs allege that McDonald's never disclosed to the public that
its cooking process includes a substance known as "beef tallow," which is "believed to be a source of cholesterol."54 In its brief analysis of this issue, the
court stated that this allegation cannot be considered under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because it was made within the plaintiffs' opposition brief and not within
the amended complaint. 55 Had the plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint
that the beef tallow contained cholesterol, it is at least possible that this allegation would have survived the court's scrutiny. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs,
however, this allegation was not made, which left the court no other option but
to sustain McDonald's motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs' failed to suffiallege that the McDonald's advertisements were objectively misleadciently
56
ing.
In sum, the plaintiffs were unable to survive McDonald's motion to dismiss because they failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
48

Id.

49

Id. (citing Marcus v. AT&T Co., 138 F.3d 46, 64 (2d Cir. 1998)).

so

Id. at **35-39.

51
52

Id. at *35.
Id. at **35-36.

53

Id. at 36.

54

Id. at 37 n.6.

55

Id.
Id. at 39.

56
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While the plaintiffs were able to show that they relied on McDonald's advertising campaigns to purchase vast quantities of its products, it simply could not be
established that the consumption of McDonald's food products was the primary
cause of the plaintiffs' health problems or that the McDonald's advertisement
campaign was objectively deceptive.
IV. DELINEATING THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN FAST FOOD
LITIGATION AND TOBACCO LITIGATION

It is generally recognized that "tobacco litigation" 57 has been a virtual
cash cow for the legal profession over the past ten years. 58 The plaintiffs bar
has successfully argued a variety of issues including claims relating to the harmful effects of cigarette smoking and smokeless tobacco, secondhand smoke, advertising, and the failure to warn consumers of hazardous effects. 59 Most remarkable was the famous "Master Settlement Agreement" that was signed in
1998 between five tobacco companies and attorney generals from forty-six
states.60 In that agreement, the tobacco companies agreed to pay over $246 billion to the states as a result of the costs incurred by the states from treating tobacco-related illness. 6 1 Private legal fees incurred as a result of this agreement
border on the miraculous: eleven Florida law firms raked in $3.4 billion, six
collected $3.3 billion, and thirteen Mississippi law firms took in
Texas law firms
62
$1.4 billion.
Numbers like these give a considerable economic incentive to enterprising lawyers seeking to broaden the marketplace by finding deep-pocketed defendants who are alleged to have caused a variety of social ills. Among these
defendants are highly profitable fast food companies that sell fatty foods with
little nutritional value. As mentioned earlier, the plaintiff's bar, relying on
For purposes of this Note, the term "tobacco litigation" refers to the myriad legal tactics the
plaintiffs bar has employed to successfully sue tobacco companies over the effects of their products.
57

See generally, WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS (2003) (discussing the social,
economic, and legal ramifications of class action lawsuits in general, and tobacco lawsuits, in
particular); see also Dwight J. Davis et al., "Fast Food": The Next Tobacco?, 4 ENGAGE 121
(2002) (providing a general overview of the major issues involved in fast food litigation).
58

See generally Bryce A. Jensen, Note, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond--A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1334 (2001) (discussing
mass tort litigation tactics used by plaintiffs).
60
See High Cost of Litigation,THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London, U.K.), Oct. 29, 2003, at D2.
59

61

See Janice Billinglsy, Cancer Report Cites Issues with Cigarette Filters, CHi. TRIB., May

26, 2002, at D4.
62

See Saundra Ton-y, Huge Fees for Anti-Tobacco Lawyers, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1998, at

Al, AI0.
63
See generally infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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precedent established by tobacco litigation, is now targeting these companies in
an effort to hold them liable for the poor physical condition of millions of unhealthy Americans. This section will attempt to delineate several distinctions
between tobacco and fast food litigation by taking the following issues in turn:
A) procedural distinctions, B) substantive distinctions, and C) factual distinctions.
A.

ProceduralDistinctions

Critical to the analysis of fast food litigation is the issue of class action
certification. Because plaintiffs have a considerable economic incentive to file
their claims as a class action, 64 the issue of certification will likely play a central
role in any future litigation. This section addresses the issue of whether the fast
food litigation plaintiffs can meet the requirements necessary to achieve class
action certification. The first subsection discusses the specific parameters set
forth in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, while the second subsection applies the history of the tobacco-related case law to the facts of the fast
food litigation.
1.

Class Action Certification: Requirements of Rule 23

In order to certify a class action lawsuit, a plaintiff must meet the specific requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Procedure. 6 5 That
•.Civil
66
First, Rule 23(a)(1)
rule contains the following four specific prerequisites.
requires that the class be "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable."' 67 Second, the rule requires that "there are questions of law or fact com-

64

See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of
Large Scale Litigation, 11 DuKE J. CoMp. & INT'L L. 179 (2001) (describing the efficacy of Rule
23 as it relates to mass tort class actions).
65
FED. R. Civ. P. 23. For an excellent discussion of the class action device used in the context
of mass tort claims, see generally John Starnes, Note, Class Certificationin Mass ProductLiability Litigation: Argument for a PragmaticApproach, 31 U. MEM. L. REv. 175 (2000). The article

advocates the increased usage of the class action device in mass tort claims. See id.
66

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Subsection (a) of the rule provides:

Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Id.
67

Id. at 23(a)(1).
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mon to the class. ' 68 The third prerequisite found in Rule 23(a) is that "the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class." 69 The final prerequisite requires that "the representative
70
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
Should the plaintiff provide sufficient evidence to meet these prerequisites, he then must satisfy the conditions of a least one of the subsections of Rule
23(b). 7 1 These three subsections represent the three types of certification that
may be granted to a class. Under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), class action certificawhen claims require a single adjudication that would bind all
tion is appropriate
72
class members.

68

id. at 23(a)(2).

69

Id. at 23(a)(3).

70

Id. at 23(a)(4).

7t

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). The rule provides:

Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
opposing the class, or
of conduct for the party
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
Id.
72

Id. at 23(b)(1)-(2).
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73
The third subsection that grants class certification is found in 23(b)(3).
This subsection requires certification when common questions of law or fact
predominate over individual issues and when a class action is superior to other
methods of adjudication. 74 Rule 23(b)(3) provides a list of the following four
factors that help courts determine whether the class action is in fact a superior
method of adjudication: A) class member interest in individually controlling the
litigation, B) amount of litigation already commenced by class action members,
C) desirability of centralizing litigation
75 in one forum, and D) any management
difficulties likely to be encountered.
Even a cursory examination of this rule suggests that the typicality prerequisite is immediately called into question when it is applied to the facts of the
fast food litigation. In fact, the court mentioned in a footnote in the first Pelman
opinion that obtaining class action certification would be difficult, if not impossible, for the plaintiffs to show. 76 The court noted in its analysis that the plaintiff would probably not even be able to bear its burden to meet the prerequisite
requirement of typicality when it stated that it is "difficult to imagine how the
typicality requirement would be satisfied, as any named plaintiff's injuries
would necessarily be a product of the particular77variables surrounding the plaintiff, whether social, environmental, or genetic."
While Judge Sweet's argument is facially reasonable, it is necessary to
compare it with the previously successful tobacco litigation. The following subsection briefly outlines the history of the tobacco class action lawsuit and then
applies those rules to the facts in Pelman.

2.

Tobacco Class Certification: A History of Failure

In making their initial arguments for the decertification of a plaintiffs'
class, fast food companies are likely to rely upon tobacco-related case law that
Three significant
applies Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
cases that address the issue of class certification are discussed below.

73

Id.at 23(b)(3).

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Pelman v. McDonald's, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 539-40 n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

77

Id.

78

See generally Mark C. Weber, Thanks for Not Suing: The Prospectsfor State Court Class

Action Litigation over Tobacco Injuries, 33 GA. L. REv. 979 (1999) (discussing the significant

barriers to the use of the federal class action lawsuit to redress tobacco-related injuries); see also
Susan E. Kearns, Note, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.

1336 (1999) (describing the plaintiffs' repeated failures at certifying a class).
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a.

Castano v. American Tobacco Co.

A leading federal case concerning the decertification of a tobaccorelated class is Castano v. American Tobacco Co.79 In Castano, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's certification of a nationwide
class of nicotine-addicted persons who had used tobacco to the detriment of
their own health.9° The district court certified the class under Rule 23 on several key issues that satisfied Rule 23's requirements of predominance and superiority because variations in state laws did not threaten predominance, and that
the efficiency of the class action device outweighed any manageability concerns.81 Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Jerry Smith decertified the class
because the plaintiffs had alleged an "immature tort," which did not meet Rule
23's superiority requirement for several reasons. 82 First, the court was not convinced that the plaintiffs demonstrated that a single proceeding would yield judicial economy benefits. 83 Also, the economic circumstances of the plaintiffs'
class did not require the usage of the class action device because "aconsortium
of well-financed plaintiffs' lawyers . . .[could] develop the expertise and spe-

cialized84 knowledge sufficient to beat the tobacco companies at their own
game."

While several commentators have devoted entire articles to the ramifications of Castano,85 an extensive discussion of that case is unnecessary for the
purposes of this Note. As one commentator suggests however, Castano stands
prefor the proposition that courts should strictly
86 apply Rule 23's commonality,
requirements.
superiority
and
dominance,

79

84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).

80

Id. at 740-41.

81

Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 552-56 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734

(5th Cir. 1996).
82
See Castano, 84 F.3d at 746-47.
83

Id. at 747-48.

84

Id. at 747-48 n.25.

See Michael H. Pinkerton, Note, Castano v. American Tobacco Company: America's Nicotine Plaintiffs Have No Class, 58 LA. L. REv. 647 (1998) (describing Castano's analytical nuances
and its application to future cases); see also Dean Malone, Comment, Castano v. American Tobacco Co. and Beyond: The Propriety of Certifying Nationwide Mass Tort Class Actions Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 When the Basis of the Suit Is a "Novel" Claim or Injury, 49
BAYLOR L. REV. 817 (1997) (outlining Castano 's implications).
86
See Pinkerton, supra note 85, at 657.
85
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Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle

87
While the tobacco plaintiffs struck out in the above case and others,
they were able to register a judgment of an astounding $144.8 billion in Engle v.
89
R.J. Reynolds,88 which was the largest jury award in United States history.
Group
That decision, however, was recently reversed and remanded in Liggett
90
Inc. v. Engle because the plaintiffs' class was improperly certified.
Citing more than twenty cases throughout the United States that concluded that certification of smokers cases is "unworkable and improper," the
court synthesized the substance of these decisions when it stated that the "plaintiffs smokers' claims are uniquely individualized and cannot satisfy the 'predominance' and 'superiority' requirements imposed by Florida's class action
rules." 9 1 In its analysis, the court noted that these requirements cannot be met92in
cases where "claims involve factual determinations unique to each plaintiff."
The court also cited Castano when it stated, "Rule 1.220 [of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure, which is based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 23]93 also requires that class representation be superior to other available
methods of fairly and efficiently adjudicating the claims presented." 94 It reasoned that class representation is not "superior" to individual suits when significant individual issues of fact exist. After a discussion of doctrinal issues rethe court held that class decertifigarding choice of law and punitive damages,
96
available.
option
proper
only
the
was
cation

87

See generally Gilbert Birnbrich, Comment, Forcing Round Classes into Square Rules:

Attempting Certification of Nicotine Addiction-As-Injury Class Actions under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 29 U. TOL. L. REv. 699 (1998) (providing a synopsis of additional
tobacco-related class decertification cases).
672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd sub nom., Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle, 853
So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). For a general discussion of Engle, see Brian H. Bar, Note,
Engle v. R.J. Reynolds, The Improper Assessment of Punitive Damages for an Entire Class of
Injured Smokers, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 787 (2001).
88

See George Bennett, Tobacco Industry Told to Pay $145 Billion, PALM BCH. POST, July 15,
2000, at Al.
90
Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), rehearing
89

grantedsub nora., Engle v. Liggett Group Inc., 873 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2004).
9'

Id.

92

Id. at 445.

93

Id.at 445 n.5.

94

Id. at 445.

95

Id.

96

Id.at 470.
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Taken together, Castano and Engle both suggest that the fast food plaintiffs will not be able to meet the requirements of Rule 23 because the class action device simply does not afford a court the opportunity to fairly analyze all
legal issues related to the case. It would be unfair to find against one plaintiff
when his injury, or the cause of his injury, is unrelated to that of another plaintiff. In short, each plaintiff represents a unique set of facts on which to provide
relief. To subject thousands of class members to a single standard begs for a
rigid application of an unjust rule.
c.

General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon

Since the Pelman court mentioned Rule 23's typicality requirement in a
footnote, 97 it is worthwhile to briefly analyze the hallmark U.S. Supreme Court
case that deals with the typicality issue. In General Telephone Co. of Southwest
v. Falcon,98 the Court considered whether a Mexican-American was a proper
plaintiff class representative in a class action under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 on behalf of other Mexican-American employee applicants who
were not hired. 99 In evaluating the typicality requirement, Justice Stevens provided the following guidance:
The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)
tend to merge. Both serve as guideposts for determining
whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a
class action is economical and whether the named plaintiffs
claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of
the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in
their absence. Those requirements therefore also tend to merge
with the adequacy-of-representation requirement, although the
latter requirement also raises concerns about the competency of
class counsel and conflicts of interest. 100
The Court then held that the plaintiff did not meet the typicality requirement because he failed to identify "the questions of law or fact that were
common to the claims of respondent and of the members of the class he sought
to represent." '1 1 This burden was not met because the plaintiff could not sub97

See supranotes 76-77.

98

457 U.S. 147 (1982).

Id. at 150; see also Annotation, Gary Knapp, Supreme Court's Construction and Application of Rule 23 of FederalRules of Civil Procedure, Concerning Class Actions, 144 L. ED. 2D
889, § 6 (2004).
100 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 158 n.13.
99

101 Id. at 158.
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stantiate his claim that all other Mexican-American employees and applicants
were the victims of the same racial discrimination that he alleged.
If that
were the case, the Court noted that "every Title VII case would be a potential
company-wide class action." 10 3 "We find nothing in the statute to indicate that
Congress intended to authorize such a wholesale expansion of class-action litigation." 10 4 The Court continued its analysis in a footnote when it stated the
following: "The mere fact that an aggrieved private plaintiff is a member of an
identifiable class of persons of the same race or national origin is insufficient to
establish his standing to litigate on 10their
behalf all possible claims of discrimina5
tion against a common employer."
While the facts of Falcon involve a Title VII employment discrimination claim, the parallels with fast food litigation are nonetheless striking. Both
Falcon and the plaintiffs' claims in the fast food litigation involve "across the
board" allegations that a single entity is responsible for damages incurred by
hundreds of claimants, without regard to specific evidentiary identifications of
tortious harms. In other words, the fast food plaintiffs can all correctly say that
they are obese and suffer from poor health. However, they cannot sufficiently
allege that these health conditions all categorically flow from the consumption
of fast food. Other variables (such as lack of exercise, alternative sources of
food, and patient health history) all play a causal role in the development of
these conditions, and each variable has a different impact on each individual.
As a result, it would be error for a court to assume that one plaintiffs health
condition is typical of hundreds of others.
B.

Substantive Distinctions

The plaintiffs bar has used a variety of tactics aimed at the tobacco industry to recover damages for injuries incurred as a result of tobacco usage. The
most prominent legal theories employed in the plaintiffs arsenal focus on the
principle of strict liability. Claims typically involve allegations of design and
10 6
manufacturing defects, the failure to warn, and fraudulent concealment.
These claims will be taken in turn.

102

Id.

103

Id. at 159.
Id.

104

105 Id. at 159 n.15.
106

See generally Sandra L. Gravanti, Note, Tobacco Litigation: United States Versus Big To-

bacco - An Unfiltered Attack on the Industry, 52 FLA. L. Rav. 671 (2000) (summarizing a history
of tobacco-related litigation).
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Design Defects

1.

Suits filed against the tobacco industry typically involve the claim that
tobacco products cause injury because they have defects in their design. These
suits allege that the addictive nature and carcinogenic effects of tobacco products constitute a design defect.' 0 7 These "defects," the reasoning goes, warrant
a finding of liability because
the tobacco products in question are unreasonably
08
dangerous in their design.1
In making the determination of whether a tobacco manufacturer is liable
for manufacturing a defective product, courts typically look to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A that states:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2)

The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relations with the
seller. 109
In interpreting this section, courts had difficulty determining the exact
nature of proof the plaintiff had to show in order to recover damages."l 0 Does
107

See id. at 674.

1o8 Id.
109

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

110

See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Litigation and Compensation:A Primer on Cigarette Litiga-
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the product have to be defective or unreasonably dangerous? Note here that the
reliance on this subsection of the Restatement allows the plaintiff to frame the
suit as a strict liability action.
The determination of whether a product is defectively designed is generally evaluated under one of the following two tests: 1) the "danger-utility" test
and 2) the "consumer-contemplation" test. I I A brief discussion of those respective tests follows.
a.

Danger-Utility Test

One test frequently invoked by the plaintiffs bar is the "danger-utility
That test, which provides for liability if the risks of injury accompanying a product's use outweilhs the utility or social value favoring the continued
availability of the product,
is a difficult standard for a plaintiff to meet because courts often require the plaintiff to establish the existence of an alternative
design that could have reduced the risk of harm. 114 While plaintiffs' victories
are rare in this area, they do exist and have become more prevalent with the discovery of tobacco industry documents that detail specific examples of fraudulent
actions over the previous forty years that were committed by the tobacco industry in an effort to misrepresent the dangers of their products. 115
An application of this standard to any set of facts concerning the consumption (and over-consumption) of fast food reveals that the plaintiff simply
cannot proffer a cognizable case. There is no evidence that the nutritional value
(or lack thereof) of fast food is a result of the deficiencies related to its design.
In fact, fast food is dangerous precisely because its design may work too well.
The Big Mac is not designed to be a healthy meal-it is designed to be a tasty
one. Accordingly, the usage of the "danger-utility" test would fail to provide
the plaintiff a meaningful and successful course of action.
test." 112

tion Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 27 SW. U. L. Rlv. 487, 492

(1998).
I

See Gravanti, supra note 106, at 675-77.

112

See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 699 (5th ed. 1984).

113

Id.

114

See Annotation, Burden of Proving Feasibility of Alternative Safe Design inProducts Li-

abilityAction Based on Defective Design, 78 A.L.R. 4TH 154 (1990).
5ls See generally Tucker S. Player, Note, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global
Settlement, and the Future of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L. REv. 311 (1998).
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b.

The Consumer-Contemplation Test

The second test employed by courts when evaluating section 402A is
the "consumer-contemplation" test.116 This test is found in a comment to the
above-quoted language of section 402A which states that a product is "unreasonably dangerous" when it is dangerous "to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer." 117 This test was recently applied in
a federal district court in Wisconsin."18 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that
the cigarettes were defective because the ordinary consumer did not understand
the health risks that flow from the continual usage of tobacco products. 119 Finding for the defendant, the court held that the "consumer expectations" test was
not met because the "habit forming nature of cigarettes" was common knowledge to the ordinary American consumer.t2°
Under this standard, the plaintiffs cannot state a claim because a reasonable consumer is fully aware of all risks that will be encountered during the
typical foray into Burger King. Consumers have known for years that fast food
contains large amounts of ingredients that are not beneficial to the average person's health (particularly when consumed in large quantities). Moreover, there
is no evidence that the fast food industry has engaged in a deceitful campaign to
trick the American public into the belief that their products are healthy. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot meet the "consumer-contemplation" test under section
402A that would afford the opportunity to state a successful claim.
2.

Failure to Warn

Another common lawsuit against the tobacco industry involved the failure to warn consumers of the inherent dangers of prolonged tobacco usage.
Under this theory, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable manufacturer would
have warned of the product's dangerous effects that were known during the time
the product reached the consumers.121 Note, however, that this cause of action
has been largely preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
116
17

See KEETON ET AL., supra note 112, at 698-99.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).

tt8 See Insolia v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1039 (W.D. Wis. 1999), affd in
part, rev'd in part,216 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2000), remanded to 128 F. Supp. 2d. 1220 (W.D. Wis.
2000).
"9
Id. at 1040.
120 Id.; see also Tompkins v. American Brands, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d. 895 (N.D. Ohio 1993),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 219 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2000), appealfiled, 362 F.3d
882 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that "it was common knowledge even in the 1950s that cigarette
smoking was linked to lung cancer.").
121

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j. (1965).
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Act, which required health warnings to be placed conspicuously on each cigarette package.
Any claim involving the failure to warn consumers of the dangers of
consuming fast food is likely to fail because fast food is not an unreasonably
dangerous product that would merit a warning. As stated throughout this Note,
ordinary consumers are well-versed on the dangers of the over-consumption of
fast food. A judicially-created mandate that requires a warning that fatty foods
could cause health problems when consumed in vast quantities would be the
height of redundancy. As will be discussed later, however, Congress is contemplating legislation that would mandate restaurants with twenty or more outlets to
conspicuously place pertinent nutritional information of every food item on each
123
menu.
3.

Fraudulent Concealment

The final weapon in the plaintiffs arsenal concerns fraudulent concealment and is based on the assertion that the tobacco industry intentionally withheld scientific evidence
12412 of the hazardous health effects of tobacco consumption. 124 While some plaintiffs have been successful with these allegations,
many of these claims have been dismissed because the dangers flowing from the
continual usage of tobacco were common knowledge and thus no duty existed to
provide consumers such information.126
An application of the fraudulent concealment action to the fast food industry would fail simply because there is no evidence of fraud perpetuated on
the public regarding the healthiness of fast food. Short of a specific set of facts
that would indicate fraud on the part of the fast food industry, this claim does
not seem to be a worthwhile avenue on which plaintiffs counsel will choose to
travel.
In sum, the typical claims used in lawsuits against the tobacco industry
will not (without a spectacular set of facts) survive a defendant's motion to dismiss when used against the fast food industry for health-related injuries.

122

15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (2000).

123 See infra Part V.C.

124 See Jones v. Am. Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 706, 710-13 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
125 See id. at 721 (holding that plaintiffs did provide sufficient evidence to survive defendant's
motion to dismiss).
126 See Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Co., 80 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Gravanti,
supra note 106, at 677-78.
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C.

FactualDistinctions

A clear distinction can be made between fast food and tobacco-that is,
fast food is not an inherently dangerous product when consumed every day. As
the Office of the Surgeon General points out, individual foods, standing alone,
are not unhealthy. 127 Moreover, unlike tobacco, there is no ingredient analogous to nicotine that is found in fast food which is addictive. While many tobacco users became addicted to a substance and suffered injury through the continued use of the product, the same cannot be said for fast food which is consumed, and in the plaintiffs case, over-consumed, entirely through the unobstructed free will of the consumer.
Another distinction that can be drawn is one that deals with the overall
economic demand of the respective products. This line of reasoning states that
the overwhelming number of Americans that consume fast food products every
day will not stand idle while the government or the court system takes affirmative steps to prohibit, tax, or otherwise regulate the usage of a product they frequently use and enjoy. This rationale is perhaps best stated by several commentators that currently represent Wendy's International Inc.:
Whereas smokers have been a minority of the total
population for decades, the same cannot be said of consumers
of fast food products. Unlike tobacco, there is no minority user
that government might seek to unfairly oppress. Because smoking currently only affects a minority, it has been easier to pass
legislation that prohibits smoking in public places, regulates advertising, and to levy confiscatory taxes on the product through
attorney general suits and punitive verdicts. In contrast, it
would be a near-impossible task to find a person who has not
eaten some form of fast food. It is a product consumed and enjoyed by the vast majority of consumers who are not likely to sit
back and suffer through its regulation, indirect taxation or pro28
hibition.1
In sum, the plaintiffs are forced to bridge a tremendous chasm when
reconciling the factual differences between tobacco products and fast food products. First, the plaintiffs can point to no addictive substance found in fast food
that compels a consumer to eat vast quantities of those products. Consumers
eat, and in many cases, overeat, fast food solely on the basis of free will. It is
within the exclusive province of the consumer, and not a court, to decide
127

See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL'S CALL TO ACTION

TO

PREVENT

AND

DECREASE

OVERWEIGHT

AND

OBESITY

2001,

available

at

http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/CalltoAction.pdf (last visited Nov. 10,
2004).
128

See Davis et al., supra note 58, at 125.
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whether to eat fast food products, and the extent to do so. Second, the overwhelming demand for fast food products makes it unlikely that a governmental
or judicial action with regards to fast food will go unnoticed by a majority of
Americans. As will be discussed in Part V, even the hint of judicial interference
with the fast food industry has already spurred severe public outcry and legislative action.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PENDING LEGISLATION
In the wake of the publicity surrounding these lawsuits, Congress has
taken steps to remedy the situation by introducing legislation designed to remove the threat of litigation facing the fast food industry. 129 Interestingly, legislation has also been introduced that would direct all restaurants with twenty or
more locations to provide to consumers nutritional information on each of its
products. 13 This section will consider the ramifications of each of these Acts.
A.

H.R. 339: PersonalResponsibility in Food Consumption Act

On January 27, 2003, a bill titled the "Personal Responsibility in Food
Consumption Act" was introduced in the House of Representatives that will
effectively preempt any civil actions brought against food sellers for healthrelated claims relating to the sell of food products. 13 The stated purpose of the
bill is "to allow Congress, State legislatures, and regulatory agencies to determine appropriate laws, rules, and regulations to address the problems of weiht
3
gain, obesity, and health conditions associated with weight gain or obesity." 1 1
Section three of the bill, entitled "Preservation of the Separation of
Powers," expressly prohibits qualified "civil liability actions" in both Federal
and State courts brought on these grounds. 133 Section four defines a "qualified
civil liability action" as the following:
[T]he term 'qualified civil liability action' means a civil action brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller
of a qualified product, or a trade association, for damages,
penalties, declaratory judgment, injunctive or declaratory
relief, restitution, or other relief arising out of, related to, or
resulting in injury or potential injury resulting from a per129 See Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2003);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003).
130
131

See The Menu Education and Labeling Act, H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003).
H.R. 339.

132

Id. § 2.

133

Id. § 3.
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son's consumption of a qualified product and weight gain,
obesity, or any health condition that is associated with a
person's weight gain or obesity, including an action brought
by a person other than the person on whose weight gain,
obesity, or health condition the action is based, and any derivative action brought by or on behalf of any person or any
representative,
spouse, parent, child, or other relative of any
134
person.
The statute then provides three reasonable exceptions that will allow
plaintiffs to bring civil actions should they meet the statutory requirements. 3 5
The first exception allows lawsuits where a manufacturer or seller
knowingly and willfully violates a Federal or State statute applicable to the manufacturing, marketing, distribution, advertisement, labeling, or sale of the product, and the violation was a
proximate cause of injury related to a person's weight gain, obesity, or any health
condition associated with a person's weight
36
gain or obesity.'
The second exception provided by the statute allows a civil suit which
alleges the "breach of express contract or express warranty in connection with
the purchase of a qualified product.' 37 The third and final exception provided
by the statute focuses on actions brought under the Federal Trade Commission
Act of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.' 38 Note, however, that at the
time of this writing, the bill is currently in committee and thereby subject to

further amendment. 139
B.

S. 1428: Commonsense Consumption Act of2003

On July 17, 2003, the Senate also introduced legislation titled the
"Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003" that will serve to prohibit healthrelated claims relating to the sell of food products.' 40 This bill's stated purpose
is to "prohibit civil liability actions from being brought or continued against
food manufacturers, marketers . . .[and] sellers ... for damages or injunctive
134

Id. § 4(5)(A).

135 Id. § 5(B)-(C).
136

Id. § 5(B)(i).

137 Id. § 5(B)(ii).
139 Id. § (5)(C).
139 This Bill was passed by the House of Representatives on March 10, 2004.
140

S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003).
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relief for claims of injury resulting from a person's weight gain, obesity or any
health condition related to weight gain or obesity."' 14 1 Pertinent statutory language states as follows:
IN GENERAL. A qualified civil liability action may
(a)
not be brought in any Federal or State court.
DISMISSAL OF PENDING ACTIONS. A qualified
(b)
civil liability action that is pending on the date of this Act shall
be dismissed immediately by the42court in which the action was
brought or is currently pending. 1
The statutory language in this bill is significantly more extensive than
its counterpart in the House because the following subsection explicitly defines
relevant terms such as "engaged in the business,"' 143 "manufacturer,"' 14 "qualified product,"' 145 and "qualified civil liability action." 146 It is important to note
that while the bill's purpose only addresses causes of action relating to "weight
gain or obesity,"' 147 it does provide a reasonable exception for claims resulting
from a "knowing and willful" violation of a federal or state statute which was a
"proximate cause of the claim of injury resulting from a person's weight gain,
obesity, or health condition."' 148 Also noteworthy is the absence of any language relating to products liability actions that do not involve claims relating to
obesity. In other words, the bill does not preempt typical tort actions such as
food poisoning that result from the consumption of food products.
While the Senate's "Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003" is still in
committee and thus subject to further amendment, it appears that its thoroughness and level of detail would afford the court system an easier and more efficient application to pending and future cases. Unlike the House's version, this
bill goes to great lengths to specify the types of actions, actors, and products that
141

Id.

142

Id. § 2.

143 Id. § 3(i) (defining "engaged in business" as "a person who manufactures, markets, distributes, advertises, or sells a qualified product in the person's regular course of trade or business").
144 Id. § 3(2) (defining "manufacturer" as "a person who is lawfully cngaged in the business of

manufacturing the product in interstate or foreign commerce").
145 Id. § 3(4) (defining "qualified product" as "food as defined in section 201(f) of the Federal

Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321(f))").
146

Id. § 3(5) (defining "qualified civil liability action" as a "civil action brought by any person

against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade association, for damages or injunctive relief based on a claim of injury resulting from a person's weight gain, [or] obesity").
147

Id.

148

Id § 3(5)(A).
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are covered by the statute. Moreover, the bill is consistent with the public policy rationale that states that businesses should not be held liable, and thereby
subject to crushing liability, for producing a perfectly legal product that can
have, at most, only a tangential role in the development of adverse health conditions.
C.

H.R. 3444: The Menu Education andLabelingAct

In response to the health-related concerns raised by the plaintiff's bar to
the fast food industry, Congress has attempted to remedy the situation by introducing a bill that will affect the manner in which the fast food industry displays
each food item on the menu. In November 2003, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced the Menu Education and Labeling Act ("MENU Act") to ensure
that consumers receive accurate "information about the nutritional content of
restaurant foods."' 14 9 Citing an array of health statistics linking fatty food con-

sumption with heart-related illnesses, Congress evidently believes that increasing the availability of nutritional information will lead to the decreased consumption of fast food, and necessarily,
an improvement in the overall health
50
status of millions of Americans. 1
Specifically, the MENU Act requires restaurants with twenty or more
outlets to list the nutritional information for each item on the menu "in a clear
and conspicuous manner." 15 1 The nutritional information shall include "the
total number of calories, grams
of saturated plus trans fat, and milligrams of
152
sodium" for each menu item.
While this bill does seem to serve as an adequate compromise between
the plaintiffs bar and the fast food industry, the realistic impact of such legislation is unclear. It is noteworthy that Congress does not point to any evidence
that would suggest that increasing the level of nutritional information will have
any negative impact on the consumption of high-fat, high-sodium foods. Bear
in mind, however, that this bill is153
only at its infancy stage and is subject to considerable debate and amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION

The conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis herein are substantial and promising. First, under the current state of the law, it appears that the
149

H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003).

150

See id. § 2.

151

Id. § 3(a).

152

Id. § 3(b).

As of Nov. 22, 2004, the bill has remained in the House Committee of Energy and Commerce.
153
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plaintiffs simply have no case in their claims that the fast food industry is responsible for their poor overall physical condition. There is no advertisement
that can be cited which deceived a reasonable consumer into believing that the
excessive consumption of fast food would not adversely impact that person's
health. Moreover, it does not appear that such an advertisement is anywhere in
sight. Short of an affirmative representation that a daily intake of Big Macs will
cause the typical consumer to experience significant weight loss and a diminished cholesterol level, it is unlikely that the plaintiffs will ever be able to point
to an advertisement that suggests to the reasonable consumer that the consistent
consumption of fast food is a healthy activity.
Second, the plaintiffs have an extremely difficult hurdle to overcome in
their attempt to establish causation. Too many variables, such as genetic history, current and prior levels of activity, exercise patterns, and foods consumed
independently from fast food restaurants, are of a determinative nature to assess
liability exclusively with the fast food industry. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the effects that fast food has on the overall health condition of a
person while holding constant all other activities that contribute to that condition. Simply stated, bald assertions that the consumption of fast food caused a
person's obesity are not sufficient-more evidence must be proffered that specifically indicates the nature of the harm that fast food consumption has caused
if the plaintiffs are ever to realize payouts that even approach the magnitude of
the successful tobacco litigation.
Finally, the legislative process may end any discussion of the fast food
litigation before it ever really begins. Both the Commonsense Consumption Act
and the Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act would effectively
preempt current and future lawsuits of this nature if and when they are signed
into law. While the Association of Trial Lawyers does have a stake in defeating
these bills, it is unlikely that they are willing to spend the political capital necessary to do so. Indeed, an examination of that group's website does not reveal
any indication154that lobbying efforts are currently being pursued to defeat either
of these bills.
On the other hand, however, the MEAL Act would represent a victory
for the consumer groups that are currently pushing for full disclosure of fast
food nutritional information. It remains to be seen if any of these bills will become law.
While Professor Banzhaf' s theory has served to facilitate the marketof
ideas with regards to the direction of the American legal system, that
place
to
appears be all that it has done. The theory that the fast food industry should
be held responsible for the health condition of a frequent consumer is entirely
without merit. Barring a remarkable set of facts that is outside this author's
154
The website of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (http://www.atla.org) was
examined unsuccessfully on November 21, 2004 for any indication of efforts taken to defeat the
above cited pieces of legislation.
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imagination, the analysis herein indicates that this theory has no legal foundation on which to build even the most attenuated of cases.
DonaldR. Richardson*
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